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Abstract
This paper investigates how the disclosure of a security
vulnerability index based on outgoing spams and phishing
website hosting, which may serve as an indicator of a firm’s
inadequate security controls, affects companies’ security pro-
tection strategy. Our core objective is to study whether firms
improve their security when they become aware of their vul-
nerabilities and such information is publicized. To achieve
this goal, we conduct a randomized field experiment on 1,262
firms in six Pan-Asian countries and regions. For the treat-
ment group of 631 firms, we alert them of their security vul-
nerability index and ranking over time, and their relative per-
formance compared to their peers via emails and a public
advisory website. Compared with the control group without
being informed of their security vulnerability index, the treat-
ment group improved their security over time, with a signif-
icant reduction of outgoing spam volume. A marginally sig-
nificant improvement in reducing phishing hosting websites
is also observed among non-web hosting firms in the treat-
ment group. The security improvement may be attributed to
firms’ proactive reaction to the security vulnerability infor-
mation. Our study provides cybersecurity policy makers with
useful insights on how to motivate firms to adopt better secu-
rity measures.
1. Introduction
Cyberattacks impose serious threats to individuals, firms,
and our society at large. Even with technological advances
in security software and hardware, we are still experiencing
an ever-increasing number of cyberattacks [1, 2] Although
firms are aware of cybersecurity issues, they are still reluc-
tant to adopt adequate measures to prevent the spread of cy-
berattacks. Such a problem is partly due to negative external-
ities, information asymmetry, and misaligned incentives [3].
Negative externalities refer to the phenomenon that firms in
a network have a higher incentive to wait than to adopt a se-
curity technology immediately because the cost of the tech-
nology adoption is greater than its initial benefit until a mini-
mum number of network players adopt it.1 Previous research
shows that such a wait-and-see approach is widely used by
senior managers and it may lead to the ubiquitous security
breaches in the US [4, 5]. In addition, due to the quality un-
certainty of security technologies available in the market2 and
misaligned incentives of for-profit firms, firms may deprior-
itize security issues when related security problems are less
likely to directly harm themselves, even though the issues cre-
ate negative externalities to other firms and the general public
at large [3, 7, 8]. In this paper, we investigate potential mea-
sures which can be effective in increasing firms’ awareness
of cyber security and internalizing the externalities to develop
more secure cyber environments. This study also echoes the
origin3 responsibility principle of the research framework of
the Bright ICT initiative [9, 10] by proposing a new security
vulnerability index to incentivize firms to behave as good cit-
izens and take a proactive approach to prevent the widespread
use of undesirable content over the Internet [11].
Similar to the idea of Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s
credit ratings, our proposed security vulnerability index may
reflect an organization’s vulnerabilities to cybercrime and its
adequacy to prevent the spread of unsolicited online content.
The index is constructed by processing large-scale, real-time
cyber incident data from spam emission4 (sources: CBL5
and PSBL6) and phishing website hosting7 activities (sources:
1An analogy to adoption of security technology is vaccinating children
against a contagious disease. A parent may choose not to vaccinate their
children and freeride on others in the same community who have already
done so [3].
2Such uncertainty may lead to the problem of “market for lemons” or
information asymmetry [6].
3Origin refers to firms whose servers may be compromised to send un-
desired content to the Internet and the company owners may or may not be
aware of such a problem and have control of it [9].
4Note that the term “spam mail” in this paper includes advertisement,
phishing mail, and malware attached email.
5Composite Block List: https://www.abuseat.org/
6Passive Spam Block List: https://psbl.org/about/
7Note that phishing, in this paper, exclusively refers to website-related
incidents, and we only focus on the firms who are actually hosting the phish-
ing websites on their own server. All email-related attacks including phishing
emails are included in our spam data.
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APWG8 and OpenPhish9). We choose spam and phishing as
data sources because they are the most commonly seen unde-
sirable content on the Internet. Firms’ computers with inad-
equate preventive security measures may be easily controlled
by their adversaries via bots to send spams or host phishing
websites. As a result, the outgoing spam volumes and phish-
ing websites hosted may be indicative of the security vulnera-
bilities of a firm. We are interested to test whether informing
and publicizing individual firms of their security vulnerabil-
ity index may motivate them to adopt better security measures
over time. To evaluate the effectiveness of such approach, we
conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment (RFE) in
Pan Asia, which is characterized by blooming e-commerce
markets and heterogeneous juridical systems. Furthermore,
our research addresses several limitations of a similar study
by [12]. First, to our knowledge, we are among the first to im-
plement RFE in Pan Asia, which is not restricted by one sin-
gle jurisdiction on cybercrime. Second, because e-commerce
is blooming in Pan Asia, it is different from the U.S., where
the sense of awareness of cybersecurity is stronger. There-
fore, our RFE treatment effects are less likely to be influenced
by external factors (e.g., stricter laws and stronger sense of
awareness on cybersecurity). Third, instead of restricting our
study to spam collected from a single data source (i.e., CBL),
we diversify the data sources and also include data on phish-
ing website hosting. The diversification of data may increase
the robustness of our proposed security vulnerability index.
Fourth, He et al. [12] has a relatively short treatment window
(from January to March 2014) and analyzed the pre- and post-
treatment in a 6-month window. We send out treatment emails
three times (July, September, and November 2017) and use a
more concise window of one month to measure the gradual se-
curity performance changes of firms over time prior to and af-
ter individual treatments. In addition to the treatment emails,
we develop a public website, cybeRatings, for the treatment
firms and the general public to search for and read more de-
tails on individual firms’ security vulnerabilities. Fifth, to en-
sure the treatment compliance, we adopt email and web an-
alytic tools to check whether the treated firms have received
our treatments properly and to tightly monitor firms’ reactions
to our treatments. Finally, we implement more robust statis-
tical analyses. Apart from the difference-in-difference (DID)
model, we also analyze the heterogeneous treatment effect.
Our empirical results show that the treatments (i.e., emails
and visits to the advisory website) induced a significant re-
duction of outbound spam volume. Our dynamic analysis
shows that there is a significant decline in CBL spam volume
after the first two batches of our treatment emails. Interest-
ingly, although we do not observe overall treatment effect on
the phishing website hosting, an extended analysis shows that
our treatments had marginally significant effects on phishing
website reduction for the firms that are neither Internet ser-
vice providers nor web hosting providers. Finally, we ana-
lyze overall security performance by Borda counts which ag-
gregate spam and phishing volumes from different sources.
8Anti-Phishing Working Group: https://apwg.org/
9OpenPhish Phishing Intelligence: https://openphish.com/
The results show that the treatments can increase country-
level security vulnerability rank, which suggests improved
performance among peers in the same countries. In sum,
our research findings show that firms have different incen-
tives when dealing with phishing website hosting compared
to spam emission.
This study contributes to the cybersecurity literature in
multiple ways. First, we develop a novel security vulnerabil-
ity index based on outgoing spam volume and phishing web-
site hosting. Second, we implement a large-scale information
system to alert treatment firms of their security vulnerabilities
by emails and to publish their vulnerability details on a public
advisory website. Third, our study comprehensively covers
all firms in the six targeted countries and regions in Pan Asia
with at least one Autonomous System Number (ASN) and one
valid contact email address. Through the large-scale field ex-
periment, we show that firms improve their internal system
security over time when they learn the information about their
security vulnerabilities by emails and our advisory website in
the short term. We also show disparate firm behaviors on dis-
closure of spam and phishing vulnerabilities. Our research
can provide useful insights to cybersecurity policy-makers.
Instead of using penalties to make firms comply, they may use
publicized security information to incentivize firms to adopt
better preventive measures to mitigate the widespread use of
undesired content. Our study also responds to the call of the
Bright ICT Initiative by developing an incentive mechanism
to promote origin responsibilities.
2. Theoretical Background
Researchers from information systems, computer science,
and economics are actively seeking the most efficient solu-
tions to contain widespread cybersecurity threats. To thwart
cybercrime, prevention and protection tools are equally im-
portant. Whilst existing research primarily focuses on protec-
tive solutions, for example, spam filtering [13, 14], intrusion
detection systems [15, 16, 17], and digital forensics [18, 19],
few discuss preventive measures, which include rules and re-
minders regarding best safety practices. In fact, prevention
comes before protection; only when prevention fails does pro-
tection take place [20]. With note of the inadequate preven-
tive measures to curb the spread of undesired online content,
the Bright ICT Initiative has established the origin responsi-
bility principle [9, 10]. How to motivate firms to adopt bet-
ter preventive security measures seems to be an important re-
search question to be addressed. In this section, we discuss
related literature at the boundary of security and economics
that investigates the relationship among incentives, externali-
ties, and security investment.
2.1. Misaligned Incentives and Security Underinvest-
ment
Anderson and Moore [3] showed that economic incentives
are as important as technical designs in information security
solutions. Senior management is willing to invest in protec-
tive security that can safeguard their internal corporate assets
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from cyberattacks. In contrast, their incentive to invest deteri-
orates when the underlying technologies are to protect assets
of external entities. Because they bear no financial benefits
from such an investment, misaligned incentives may lead to
underinvestment in information security [21]. As a result,
managers may simply adopt the minimal security measures
to protect their own assets, rather than a comprehensive secu-
rity solution that can prevent widespread cyberattacks to the
general public.
2.2. Heterogeneity Defense
Sharman et al. [22] show that the diversity in security in-
vestment is important to deter cybercrime. Such a strategy
is known as “functionality defense by heterogeneity.” If a
firm only focuses on one type of security (e.g., protection)
with negligence on another (e.g., prevention), the security so-
lutions are not considered to be thorough. A firm that fails to
invest in comprehensive security not only increases the proba-
bility of its own security risks but also increases the likelihood
that such risks will spill over to other firms [23]. Instead,
diversification in security investment may help prevent corre-
lated failures (e.g., shared vulnerabilities due to homogeneous
security investment and loss of availability of connected com-
pany networks) [24].
2.3. Information Disclosure as Externality
Network externalities may provide some explanation re-
garding the reluctance of firms to adopt adequate security
measures. Kunreuther and Heal [25] demonstrate that the se-
curity of a group of people often leans on each of its members.
As one user in the system takes more precautions to protect
his/her computers, the less the others in the same group will
be infected or intruded upon. Such a setting leads to the clas-
sic free-rider problem that each user in the system lacks the
incentive to adequately protect themselves against attacks or
viruses because the cost of the spread of the attacks or viruses
is borne by other users. Therefore, in the absence of a market
for appropriate incentives, individuals will choose less secu-
rity than the social optimal level. In other words, firms may
deprioritize IT security problems when they are less likely to
directly harm themselves, even though they create negative
externalities to others (e.g., spam and phishing attacks initi-
ated by their compromised computers).
To combat the problems brought by the negative externali-
ties of security underinvestment, one approach can be to alert
firms of their security vulnerabilities and the associated loss
due to such insecurity. To quantify such loss, previous re-
search proposes the use of a “vulnerability matrix” [26] and
“node failure correlation matrix” [24]. Besides enhancing
awareness, public disclosure of attack incidents may help de-
fenders get prepared against cybercrime [27]. In the same
token, public disclosure of a firm’s vulnerabilities in spam
may make the firm take more proactive security action to sal-
vage its public reputation [28]. Such disclosure may also al-
leviate the information asymmetry issue and allow firms to
better understand their security weakness [12]. Furthermore,
social comparison and peer pressure may incentivize firms
even more to adopt better countermeasures [29]. It may also
serve as an additional externality to raise firms’ cybersecurity
awareness due to the fear of losing customers to their com-
petitors [30].
Based on the literature review, we find that security aware-
ness enhancement can be an effective mechanism to motivate
firms to adopt an optimal level of security solutions and pre-
vent the wide spread of undesired online content. To achieve
this aim, we can inform firms of their security vulnerabilities.
To amplify the effect, we can use the method of public disclo-
sure and facilitate firms to compare their security performance
with that of their peers. In the next section, we will discuss
how to evaluate the effectiveness of such a design through a
randomized field experiment.
3. Experimental Design and Implementation
3.1. Development of Security Vulnerability Index
An organization’s Internet security condition is a latent
variable that cannot be directly measured. However, one way
to estimate it is by the use of perceptible data. Security attacks
originating from a corporate network may be a good indica-
tor of weak security infrastructure. To estimate the number of
attacks, we can use outbound spam volume and phishing web-
sites as proxies. According to Symantec’s MessageLabs, over
50% of spam is sent by botnets [31]. These infected com-
puters and servers may be used by adversaries as media for
even more serious cyberattacks, for example, distributed de-
nial of service (DDoS) attacks, identity thefts, hacking, data
breaches, and cyber vandalism. In this research, we use (1)
outbound spam volume generated from a corporate network
and (2) number of phishing websites hosted in the corporate
network to construct a comprehensive security vulnerability
index.
To construct a composite ranking from four constituent
rankings from each data source (i.e., CBL, PSBL, APWG,
and OpenPhish), we use Borda count [32]. First, we extract
the ranking for each of the five combinations of data sources
and metrics (CBL Volume, PSBL Volume, APWG volume,
OpenPhish volume, and HSIC) with worse performance be-
ing ranked higher in terms of spam or phishing volume. Next,
we can construct the composite Borda ranking by taking a
firm’s rank k for a given ranking and grant that firm a point
of (n + 1 - k) for that ranking, where n is the total number
of firms in that ranking. Finally, we sum these points for the
individual rankings to produce the Borda count for each firm.
Firms with higher Borda counts get higher composite Borda
ranks, which indicate worse performance. Firms with the best
security level (e.g., no spam and phishing volume) are ranked
equally the lowest.
3.2. Randomized Field Experiment (RFE)
To causally test whether publicized security information
increases firms’ awareness and eventually improves their se-
curity over time, we employ randomized field experiment
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Figure 1: Design of the Randomized Field Experiment
(RFE) along with econometric analysis as the main evalua-
tion methodology. RFE, also referred to as a randomized con-
trolled trial, is a well-established evaluation methodology in
the social sciences for policy interventions, in which the find-
ings can be explained by different factors associated with the
interventions [33]. The main advantage of this methodology
is its capability of detecting a causal relationship in a naturally
occurring environment.
The firms in this experiment were split into two equally
sized, statistically homogeneous groups by stratified and
match-pair randomization [34]. The grouping is summarized
in Figure 1. In the treatment group, advisory emails with se-
curity evaluation reports were sent to relevant contacts within
each organization in three different time periods. Each treat-
ment email included (i) the organization’s spam and phishing
data, such as total spam mail and phishing website hosting
volume, (ii) peer rankings in the corresponding industry sec-
tors or certain region, and (iii) a hyperlink to a designated ad-
visory webpage for the treated firm. The webpage also facil-
itated peer search of security vulnerability reports over time.
In the control group, there was no such treatment.
Figure 2: System Architecture
3.3. Data
Firstly, we collected a full list of 1,930 registered ASN in-
formation from the target Pan-Asian countries and regions via
the WHOIS database10. After mapping the ASNs to registered
10WHOIS database: https://whois.icann.org/en
Table 1: Number of firms for each country and district
Countries and
Districts
Number of
Firms
Control
Group
Treatment
Group
Hong Kong 309
631 631
Mainland China 309
Singapore 264
Malaysia 171
Taiwan 138
Macau 4
Others 67
Total 1,262 1,262
company names, we created a list of 1,293 firms who own at
least one ASN. Lastly, we manually collected and validated
corporate email addresses from those firms and finalized a
list of 1,262 firms. It is important to point out that our field
experiment was conducted with a “full population” of firms
who own at least one registered ASN and a valid email ad-
dress in six Pan-Asian countries and regions. Table 1 shows
the number of firms in each country. Figure 2 illustrates the
architecture of the entire experimental system. The system is
concurrently hosted by two authors’ research centers.
4. Empirical Analysis
Our data were taken from 1,262 firms from six Pan-Asian
countries and regions: Hong Kong, Mainland China, Singa-
pore, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Macau. Among them, 631 firms
were randomly selected for the treatment group and the rest
were placed in the control group. Once we received approval
from the human research ethics committees of the authors’
universities to implement this research, we contacted firms in
the treatment group to provide them with the opportunity to
opt out of the experiment and three firms choose to opt out.
Starting in July 2017, we sent out a batch of security informa-
tion emails to firms in the treatment group every two months,
for a total of three batches. Overall, 565 out of 631 treatment
firms successfully received at least one treatment email. As a
result, we used these 565 firms and their corresponding 565
firms in the control group as our empirical analysis data set,
for a total of 1,130 firms. Table 2 contains summary statistics
for the main variables in our empirical analysis. We collected
each firm’s number of IP addresses from Team Cymru.11 Note
that the Team Cymru does not have IP address information for
a small number of firms in our dataset.
To evaluate whether the security performance of the firms
in the treatment group had improved after our intervention,
we compared treatment firms’ outbound spam and phishing
volume prior to and after our experimental intervention with
those from the control group. Since the first batch of emails
was sent in July 2017, we used 6-month average spam and
phishing volume between January 2017 and June 2017 as
firms’ pre-experiment security measures. To check the in-
ternal validity of our randomized field experiment, we used
t-tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test) to examine
11Team Cymru: https://www.team-cymru.com/
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Variable description Mean S.D. Max Min
Log(cv+1) Log transformed CBL volume 2.099 3.667 18.420 0
Log(pv+1) Log transformed PSBL volume 0.393 1.339 11.969 0
Log(av+1) Log transformed APWG volume 0.0340 0.275 6.125 0
Log(ov+1) Log transformed OpenPhish volume 0.0678 0.388 4.663 0
Number of
IP addresses
Total number of IP addresses
owned by each firm 352,038.3 3,936,268 141 million 0
If has social
media account
If the company has at least
one social media account 0.7035 0.4569 1 0
If has opened
treatment emails
If a firm has opened a
treatment email on or before this month 0.2062 0.4048 1 0
If has visited
treatment website
If a firm has visited our advisory
website on or before this month 0.07080 0.2566 1 0
Table 3: Baseline comparison for internal validity
Variable Mean Difference t-statistics K-S prob(P value)
ln(CV) -0.05986 -0.2962 0.909
CV -38.25 -0.3251 0.796
ln(PV) -0.03817 -0.5162 1.000
PV 0.03769 0.2849 1.000
ln(OV) -0.02108 -1.0929 1.000
OV -0.0001904 -1.3810 1.000
ln(AV) -0.001803 -0.2708 1.000
AV -0.0000164 -0.5911 1.000
ln(number of
IP addresses) 0.1673 0.7346 0.751
number of
IP addresses 101837.1 0.3094 0.751
If has social
media account -0.1815 0.8560 1.000
HSIC
(first 2 digits) 1.000
whether firms in the treatment group were statistically equiv-
alent to those in the control group. The results are shown
in Table 3. We observed that the differences of the average
characteristics and the distributions between the treatment and
control groups were marginal, and none of them were statis-
tically significant. Therefore, our randomization satisfies the
assumption of exogeneity.
4.1. Difference-in-Differences (DID) Analysis
We face a non-compliance issue as some firms might not
receive or actually open our treatment emails. Thus we started
with an intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis. We used a com-
pany’s spam volume and phishing website count from July
2017 to December 2017 as its security performance (i.e., de-
pendent variable) after our experimental intervention. If a
firm’s security condition improved, we would expect a reduc-
tion of spam emission and phishing hosting compared with
those of the control group after our treatment. For the panel
data set of firms’ spam and phishing information from January
2017 to December 2017, we applied a DID model to estimate
the average treatment effect of our intervention. In particu-
lar, the email treatment dummy variable email treatit was
set equals to 1 if a firm i was in the treatment group and had
successfully received the treatment email in month t. Specif-
ically, the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression function is
as follows:
yit = α0 + α1email treatit + θi + σt + it (1)
where yit is one of the four security performance measures
in our data set. From Table 2, we can see that the distribu-
tions of all main variables are highly skewed, thus we used
log transformed spam or phishing volume as our dependent
variables.12 Moreover, in our data set, 20.62% of treated
firms have opened our treatment emails. In other words, about
41.5% of the treated organizations who received the treatment
emails have opened them. In Equation 1, α1 is our main vari-
able of interest. If α1 is negative and statistically significant,
then compared with firms in the control group, the security
performance of those in the treatment group has improved af-
ter our intervention. To control for an organization’s time-
invariant unobservable characteristics and temporal variation,
we also included organization-specific (θi) and month (σt)
fixed effects in our regression.
The main results are reported in Table 4. The results
show that among different security performance measures,
the treatment had significantly effect on firms’ outbound spam
volume as measured by CBL. The estimated treatment effect
on PSBL spam volume is negative but not statistically signifi-
cant. On the other hand, for phishing information, there is no
evidence showing that our intervention motivates firms to cor-
rect their phishing website hosting behavior. The results sup-
port our proposition that firms will have different responses to
spam and phishing information. While firms care about their
own internal security issues (i.e., their own computers being
compromised), it seems that they are reluctant to solve nega-
tive externality issues (i.e., hosting phishing websites) [3].
Since three different batches of emails were sent, we can
evaluate how the treatment effects evolve from the first batch
to the third one. If firms put emphasis on security, they would
respond to our emails consistently over time. On the other
12Specifically, using CBL spam volume as an example, the dependent
variable used in the analysis is ln(CV ) = log(CV + 1).
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Table 4: DID analysis on monthly security measures
ln(CV) ln(PV) ln(AV) ln(OV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
email treat -0.135** -0.000842 0.00974 -0.00766
(0.0682) (0.0338) (0.0114) (0.0121)
Organization
fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Month
fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.893*** 0.287*** 0.0417*** 0.0779***
(0.0341) (0.0166) (0.00522) (0.00698)
Number of
observations 13,560 13,560 13,560 13,560
Number of
organizations 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130
R-squared 0.014 0.053 0.012 0.004
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
hand, they may put lower priority on our emails after a few
months. To empirically test this, we have included three in-
teraction terms representing each round of emails separately.
The results are reported in Table 5, which show that the first
two emails have significantly reduced firms’ outbound CBL
spam volume, while the last one’s impact is quite marginal.
Considering the fact that the outcomes of firms’ security pro-
tect measures may not show up until a few months later, the
significant effect in the second round might be partially due
to the influence from the first email. This result can be an
evidence of our hypothesis that firms do not pay enough at-
tentions to security problems, as they stop responding to our
treatments after a few months.
Figure 3: Monthly interaction coefficients for the DID
trend test on CV
One common assumption of the DID model is the parallel
trend assumption, which means that in the absence of treat-
ment, the difference between the control and treatment groups
is constant over time [35, 36]. Violation of this assumption
Table 5: Treatment effects of three batches of emails
ln(CV) ln(PV) ln(AV) ln(OV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
email interaction1 -0.157** 0.0230 0.00287 -0.0105
(0.0788) (0.0485) (0.00810) (0.0126)
email interaction2 -0.179** -0.00936 0.0252 -0.000239
(0.0801) (0.0340) (0.0155) (0.0156)
email interaction3 -0.0676 0.0145 0.00182 -0.00525
(0.0833) (0.0441) (0.0175) (0.0154)
Organization
fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Month fixed
effects yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.893*** 0.287*** 0.0417*** 0.0779***
(0.0341) (0.0166) (0.00522) (0.00698)
Number of
observations 13,560 13,560 13,560 13,560
Number of
organizations 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130
R-squared 0.014 0.053 0.012 0.004
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
can lead to biased estimates. Though our analysis is based
on a randomized field experiment, we still include the leads
and lags of the treatment effect [37]. Specifically, we add
interactions between the treatment dummy and the monthly
dummies, and use the interaction with June as the baseline.
Figure 3 illustrates the estimated coefficients of these interac-
tions. It is clear that none of the pre-treatment interactions is
significant, which shows that the parallel trend assumption is
met.
4.2. Treatment Effects on Firms with Security Issues
One possible reason of the insignificant results of PSBL
and phishing volume models in Table 4 is that many firms did
not have security issues (i.e., zero spam volume or no phishing
website) during the period of our experiment. Because secu-
rity condition is a relatively hard characteristic to observe, it is
possible that our existing security measures doe not evaluate
all firms’ cyber security conditions in a highly accurate man-
ner. Although these firms’ security protection levels may have
changed, we may lack the ability to precisely measure the dif-
ference in our current experiment. Table 6 confirms this. It
shows that approximately 40% of all firms in our data showed
a positive spam volume based on CBL. However, only ap-
proximately 22% of them had a positive spam volume based
on PSBL. For the two phishing volume measures, only ap-
proximately 5% and 8% of firms had a positive volume based
on APWG and OpenPhish, respectively.
For the reasons discussed above, we repeat the main analy-
sis using a subset of firms which have positive outbound spam
volume or phishing website counts, respectively. If our treat-
ment emails are effective, we should observe that spam vol-
ume or phishing website count from those firms have a larger
reduction after the intervention. The results are reported in
Table 7. For the first two columns, we only use data from
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Table 6: Number of firms in control and treatment
groups with positive spam or phishing volume
Number of
firms
Number of firms
with positive volume
before experiment
(treatment)
Number of firms
with positive volume
before experiment
(control)
CV 1,130 228 230
PV 1,130 131 120
AV 1,130 31 27
OV 1,130 46 43
treated firms with either positive CBL or PSBL volumes and
their matched control ones. For columns 3 and 4, we only
use data from treated firms with phishing websites in either
APWG or OpenPhish and their matched control ones. Com-
pared with the data in Table 4, we found that the magnitude
of the treatment effect for CBL spam volume is larger. More
importantly, the treatment effect for PSBL spam volume is
significantly negative at 10% level. This result further indi-
cates that our email treatment will motivate firms to improve
their security protection, leading to less outbound spam vol-
ume. However, for the phishing performance, we still could
not find evidence of a reduction in phishing volume. A possi-
ble reason may be the small sample sizes in phishing website
hosting data.
4.3. Hosting and Non-hosting Firms’ Phishing Web-
sites
There were multiple potential reasons for the overall in-
significant treatment effects on phishing website hosting be-
havior. First, there were only a small number of firms with
phishing websites during our study time period. In total, we
had 124 firms (in either control or treatment group) which
had at least one phishing website in any month. In addition,
our phishing measure evaluated the number of phishing web-
sites hosted by the focal firm, and the websites were targeting
external entities. In that sense, there may be an externality
issue where the associated risk did not directly harm the fo-
cal firm. For the hosting service providers, phishing website
owners could be considered to be legitimate customers. As a
result, web hosting firms might not have a strong incentive to
take down the websites in question owned by their legitimate
customers. To testify this proposition, we further divide firms
into two groups: Group 1 consisted of only Internet service
providers and web hosting firms, with the rest being regarded
as Group 2. The results support our conjecture that the inter-
vention had a marginally significant effect in phishing website
reduction for the firms in Group 2 and that had no effect on
the firms in Group 1.
4.4. Overall security performance
So far, we have investigated how firms’ security protection
evolves after our treatments based on each individual security
measure. Another important question to explore is how the
treated organizations’ overall security conditions change af-
Table 7: Analysis on subset firms with positive security
measures before the experiment
Sample of positive
spam volume
Sample with
phishing websites
ln(CV) ln(PV) ln(AV) ln(OV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
email treat -0.430*** -0.128* 0.178* -0.138
(0.138) (0.0708) (0.107) (0.120)
Organization
fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Month
fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Constant 3.255*** 0.538*** 0.335*** 0.697***
(0.0700) (0.0340) (0.0471) (0.0697)
Observations 5,544 5,544 1,200 1,200
Number of
organizations 462 462 100 100
R-squared 0.033 0.091 0.109 0.038
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ter our interventions. In order to combine the four different
security measures from both spam and phishing perspectives,
we utilize the ranking data based on Borda count, which we
reported both in the treatment emails and on our website.
After we have created the Borda count for each firm-month
observation, we rank all firms based on the value, by each
country or by each industry. Then, we use the rank informa-
tion as the dependent variable and repeat the DID analysis.
The results are reported in the Table 8. The results show that
after our experiment, the treated firms’ relative security rank-
ing has significantly improved (lower ranking means better
security performance). For the industry level ranking, the re-
sults are not statistically significant. It seems that compared
with other firms in the same country, treated ones have taken
measures to improve their security level. In addition, based on
the results of monthly interactions in Figure 4, we can see that
the main effect happened after the first batch of emails. This
also echoes the results in the main analysis that our treatment
effects last in a short time period.
5. Research Discussion
In our experiment, we used outbound spam volume and
phishing websites as two distinct perceptible cyberattack data
sources to measure the pre- and post-experimental cyberse-
curity risk level of the firms. Security rankings were pub-
lished on our cybeRatings website13 to not only enhance the
security awareness of the general public, but also to increase
economic motivations for firms. From a series of regression
analyses on two different types of cyberattacks, we found ev-
idence that the security report publication has a statistically
significant effect in reducing spam volume in a short time pe-
riod. The results showed that publicized security information
may compel firms to adopt better preventive measures against
spam emission.
13cybeRatings: https://cyberatings.is.cityu.edu.hk
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Table 8: Analysis on firms’ security rankings
Full sample Sample w/ security incidents
Country
rank
Industry
rank
Country
rank
Industry
rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
email treat 0.563** 0.177 1.304** 0.447
(0.276) (0.231) (0.532) (0.459)
Organization
fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Month
fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Constant 35.44*** 22.59*** 33.74*** 22.68***
(0.181) (0.144) (0.313) (0.255)
Observations 13,560 13,560 5,472 5,472
Number of
organizations 0.261 0.135 0.153 0.071
R-squared 1,130 1,130 456 456
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interestingly, we did not find a statistically significant ef-
fect on mitigating phishing website hosting behavior. There
are two possible explanations for this: First, web hosting firms
do not have economic incentives to eliminate phishing web-
sites because they are legitimate customers of the hosting ser-
vices. This can be considered to be a negative externality
issue. Second, due to a lack of phishing-related laws and
policies, the malicious entities and telecommunication firms
face less liability risks for the phishing attacks and resulting
damages. Following this line, some ISPs and hosting services
may indirectly pass the responsibilities onto their customers.
Third, web hosting firms adhere to the non-self-censorship
principle. Therefore, they do not content filter web materi-
als uploaded by their customers, allowing phishing website
owners to abuse the firms’ web hosting services for malicious
activities.
Although we did not have statistically significant results in
phishing reduction, we observed anecdotal cases in which our
treatment induced positive changes: among 46 treated firms
who hosted phishing websites according to OpenPhish data,
six of them actually eliminated all phishing websites within
one or two months after their first response (opened an email
and/or visited the website) to our treatment. Based on the
other phishing data from APWG, among 31 firms who hosted
phishing websites, four fully addressed the issues. This result
may suggest that the provided information was appreciated
and induced a certain level of improvement in the subject’s
information security condition.
To summarize, our results from the empirical analysis sug-
gest that information security monitoring websites, such as
cybeRatings, can be effective in reducing botnet activities
represented by outgoing spam volume. Meanwhile, we ob-
served that firms have different incentives in terms of manag-
ing phishing attacks. This work may have policy implications
in that stronger regulations may be required to internalize the
negative externalities resulting from phishing websites hosted
by malicious entities.
Figure 4: Monthly interaction coefficients for the DID
trend test on country level ranking
Apart from legislation, our analysis also shows that pub-
lic disclosure of information security performance may be
an alternative approach to encourage firms to invest in se-
curity improvement and adopt better security measures. The
primary reason for such an improvement is that by alerting
firms of their security vulnerabilities, they are under signifi-
cant pressure with respect to losing their customers and be-
ing surpassed by their peers in the same industries; thus, they
are willing to substantially invest in security improvements to
prevent future attacks and are more proactive in information
security so as to create a better corporate social responsibility
image. With all these reasons, public disclosure of informa-
tion security performance may have direct and indirect effects
to encourage firms to invest in information security over time.
6. Limitations and Future Research
One limitation of our current experiment is that the com-
munication channel to subjects was only emails. The emails
may only be received by operating staff, rather than customers
or investors of the focal firms. As a result, the publicity ef-
fect may be limited. As a future direction, we plan to expand
our communication channels to social media platforms (e.g.,
Twitter, Facebook, Linkedin, Weibo, and WeChat). Apart
from IT staff members, the social media followers may also
be informed of the security evaluation reports with the treated
firms. One unique advantage of using a social media treat-
ment compared to an email treatment is that social media
are closely followed by customers and strategic partners. As
such, information disclosure on social media may lead to
more pronounced reactions from the treatment firms.
Another limitation of our study is the focus of the firms in
six Pan-Asian countries and regions. A possible extension is
to expand the scope of the experiment to firms in other coun-
tries. Because our data sources include phishing and spam
data from more than 200 countries worldwide, we plan to gen-
erate and publicize security reports for other regions. With a
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larger sample size, we may be able to test the efficacy of dif-
ferent treatment contents (e.g., security vulnerability index,
the index with a list of IP addresses involved in cybercrime,
and index with possible countermeasures).
Finally, our security performance measures only include
outgoing spam and phishing website hosting. Performance
against other common cybercrime (e.g., DDoS) can also be
analyzed. In fact, there is a possible spillover effect in our
treatment group. Emails alerting firms of potential spam and
phishing problems may make them aware of other cybercrime
and improve overall security levels to deter other cybercrime
as well. These areas may be further studied in future research.
7. Conclusion
The US Department of States and European Commission
advocate the use of 3Ps, namely, prevention, protection, and
prosecution, to combat crime (e.g., human trafficking and do-
mestic violence). Despite the wisdom contained in the idiom
“prevention is better than cure”, it is also the weakest link
in preventing the wide spread of cybercrime. Due to nega-
tive externalities and misaligned incentives, firms may simply
choose not to adopt any preventive solutions. To some extent,
it is very similar to air pollution in that people who connect
insecure computers to the network do not bear the full conse-
quences of their actions and make a poor security investment
[3, 21]. In this paper, we show that publicizing a vulnerability
index may rectify such misaligned incentives. To some extent,
such an approach may achieve similar results to other mea-
sures such as legislation [38], subsidy on self-protection [39]
and penalties/taxes for non-compliance [9] to heighten pub-
lic awareness to related cybercrime. Besides, our suggested
approach requires lower processing costs (e.g., time and ef-
fort to collect evidence for prosecution) and may incentivize
firms to uphold origin responsibility, which is one of the four
principles of the Bright ICT Initiatives.
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